er's reconnaissance has unity of command if it is under the control of the common company commander. But this is probably one of the few things the members of the patrol have in common. They are not a team. They are an ad hoc organization, and we are all, by now, familiar enough with Task Force Smith in Korea to know the dangers of ad hoc organizations.

In discussing AirLand Battle imperatives, FM 100-5 says that to ensure unity of effort, "habitual relationships are used to maximize teamwork." The closest thing to teamwork on a leader's reconnaissance is the relationship between the commander and his RTO. These are the only two members who routinely work literally side by side, and probably the only two who have ever fired and maneuvered together. Why create an ad hoc organization to do something when we already have units that are trained and equipped specifically for that purpose?

This brings me to my recommendation. I suggest changing the term "leader's reconnaissance" in our FMs and MTPs to simply "reconnaissance." The important thing is getting the needed information, not who gets it. Squads, platoons, and even companies have reconnaissance tasks listed in their MTPs. They are organized, equipped, and trained for the job. They have developed SOPs and have rehearsed them.

AirLand Battle doctrine is based largely on small-unit initiative. If a company commander doesn't have a squad in his company that he can trust to recon an objective, he has a much larger problem. Additionally, giving the sub-unit the reconnaissance mission early in the troop-leading procedures allows time for reconnaissance that a leader's reconnaissance from the ORP does not. Even if the reconnaissance is compromised, the commander has time to adjust his plan to minimize the effects of loss of surprise.

As part of the training process, the commander must explain to his sub-units what he wants from the reconnaissance. What specific information does he need? What are the indicators? What gives him his nice, warm feelings? The commander does not just tell a squad leader to pick a "good" support position; he asks questions about the characteristics of a good support position, and uses briefbacks to make sure the squad leader's definitions coincide with his own. He explains certain considerations of mission, enemy, terrain, troops, and time (METT-T) that may affect the mission. For example, does he want to maximize weapon standoff by having the support position relatively far away from the objective, or does he want it closer in to improve accuracy against selected targets? If he tells the squad leader what information he needs and why, chances are he'll get that information (task and purpose). If not, the problem is in training, not in decentralization.

Decentralization is integral to our doctrine, and our doctrine has proved its worth. FM 100-5 says: *Decentralization demands subordinates who are willing and able to take risks* [training] *and superiors who nurture that willingness and ability in their subordinates* [command climate]. *If subordinates are to exercise initiative without endangering the overall success of the force, they must thoroughly understand the commander's intent and the situational assumptions* [METT-T] *on which it was based.*

There certainly is a place for the leader's reconnaissance, but it is not the only answer. In fact, it often presents problems that could be solved by allowing a properly trained sub-unit to do the reconnaissance. In other cases, it may be appropriate for the leader to accompany the sub-unit to get a first-hand feel for the situation. There are several options and, for this reason, the term *reconnaissance* should replace *leader's reconnaissance* in our FMs and MTPs.

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CAS In the Deep Fight?

CAPTAIN DOUGLAS P. SCHAARE
CAPTAIN WILLIAM S. McCALLISTER

The 2d Infantry Division's success during its Battle Command Training Program (BCTP), Warfighter '92, was largely a result of the effective coordination of the division's artillery and close air support (CAS) assets.

In this exercise, the division needed to win the deep battle to shape the close fight. Our preparations for the exercise therefore focused on establishing a technique for coordinating the employment of air and organic indirect fires in support of the deep battle. If artillery and air assets were to be coordinated effectively, we would have to have a flexible and responsive way to bring massive firepower to bear against fixed, newly acquired, and previously undetected tar-

our intelligence gathering assets and focus our firepower within a specific area.

The G-3 Air, ALO, and division targeting officer maintained the kill box overlay, which identified areas to be serviced by both indirect artillery and air support. The overlay kept the targeting officer abreast of the locations on which CAS sorties would be focused, and this simplified the development of SEAD fire missions. The ALO informed the targeting officer of the expected TOTs, and the targeting officer timed SEAD fires to hit before these CAS TOTs. General support artillery—after coordination with the division fire support element, the G-3 Air, and the ALO—then executed the attacks against the enemy air defenses.

The coordinating agencies for massed fires remained the same, the only difference being that lateral separation instead of timed separation would be used to prevent conflicts between artillery and CAS sorties.

The ability to coordinate CAS and indirect fires on a specific kill box greatly improved the synchronization of fires; it also simplified the acquisition of targets, the massing of fires, and the protection of CAS assets. As a result, the division established these techniques as standing operating procedure.

The effective coordination of the 2d Infantry Division's artillery and close air support greatly contributed to its warfighting capability and its success during Warfighter '92.

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The Battalion XO

Leader, Coordinator, Trainer, Logistician

COLONEL COLE C. KINGSEED

The executive officer in an infantry battalion has always played an important, but frequently misunderstood, role. Most infantrymen are familiar with the XO's traditional "beans and bullets" duties, but any commander who limits his XO's responsibilities to these functions fails to take advantage of the experience this field grade officer brings to the command.

Before I left my last command, a young major asked me what advice I would give to a newly assigned executive officer and what I would expect of him. Having commanded a light infantry battalion, and having served as executive officer at company, battalion, and brigade levels, I would like to outline my response to these questions. For the sake of clarity, I have organized my remarks into four general areas:

Battalion Second-in-Command (2IC). As the senior major in the battalion, the executive officer has a role as the battalion's second-in-command (or 2IC as the British term it) and must be ready to assume that duty in the commander's absence. This is the XO's most important function and one for which he can readily train. Still, a few words of caution are in order.

Although the XO is the second most senior officer in the battalion, he is not the commander. He should therefore respect and support the company commanders' right to talk directly to the battalion commander. Granted, the relationship between the XO and the subordinate commanders varies from one command to another. The XO serves a better purpose, however, if he can ensure that the battalion commander's directives are implemented without antagonizing the company commanders or interfering with their ability to command their respective units.

The most effective executive officers I have encountered in more than 20 years of service have been those who developed a healthy professional relationship with the subordinate commanders. Company commanders often use the XO as a sounding board for their training concepts before they approach the battalion commander directly. Although many issues can be settled only through green-tab channels, just as often these same issues can be approached indirectly through the XO—especially if the XO and the battalion commander have established a good rapport.

Frequently, the XO will assume temporary command in the battalion commander's absence. In these instances, the